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I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s technological world, it is common for corporations and
individuals alike to enjoy and exploit the benefits of cloud computing.
These advancements, however, come with a price as the modern tech-
nological age continues to grow. By its very nature, the normal course
of business has changed drastically. From private entrepreneurial
websites to conglomerates like Amazon, Inc., making purchases on-
line has never been easier. Rather than traveling to your products,
consumers today simply create an account with a certain business,
enter personal credentials, provide a credit or debit card number for
the transaction, and give an address for the shipment of their newly
owned product.
As a way to facilitate this course of business, it is normal for online
venders to utilize their consumer’s information and store it for future
use in the event that the consumer would like to purchase again. Due
to the storing of valuable information onto the cloud, an increasing
number of online security breaches via hacking from unauthorized in-
dividuals has occurred. This has led to multiple areas of contention
between state laws and regulations, the businesses found therein,
along with their valuable stored information and the use of the cloud
itself.
This Note aims to fill the gaps between the legal and the constantly
changing technological world. Since valuable personal property is at
243
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stake when consumer information is stored in online databases, it is
imperative that laws offering protection provide adequate safeguards
to those most at risk. In filling these gaps, this Note first explains the
use of cloud computing, including cloud variations and the essential
components to these online databases. Second, this Note delves into
an in-depth analysis of Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corporation, a recent FTC (Federal Trade Commission)
case that has provided uncertainty in the cybersecurity world. Third,
this Note identifies the gray areas from Wyndham that remain in ques-
tion as well as provides a foundation of existing case law to shed light
on the topic. Fourth, this Note proposes a change in the FTC’s current
proceedings to provide a rule that identifies specific cybersecurity
measures to obtain adequate protections in the event of cyber attacks.
II. CLOUD COMPUTING
A. Generally
Cloud computing is an internet-based service that allows online
users to store and access information over the Internet rather than a
personal computer’s hard drive. Through the development of this
technology, businesses benefit from the use of cloud computing in sev-
eral ways including: cost savings, reliability, manageability, and a stra-
tegic edge over competitors.1 As a result, it does not come as a shock
that the number of small businesses using cloud computing is expected
to increase from 37% to 80% by 2020.2
In a virtual sense, clouds come in many shapes and sizes. Data
clouds can be public, private, or a hybrid of the two. Furthermore,
depending on what the cloud actually provides for a user, a cloud can
be deemed as an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (“IaaS”), a Platform-as-a-
Service (“PaaS”), or a Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”).3 Each type of
cloud has its own specific attributes that make it more desirable for
users depending on the services needed. That being said, this Note will
primarily focus on where a cloud is located, being public or private,
and the major implications of how either type can be seriously sub-
jected to data breaches that can create problems for businesses
everywhere.
1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Cloud Computing, LEVELCLOUD, http://
www.levelcloud.net/why-levelcloud/cloud-education-center/advantages-and-disadvan
tages-of-cloud-computing/ (last visited May 23, 2016).
2. Graham Winfrey, How the Cloud Will Transform Business by 2020, INC. (Aug.
7, 2014), http://www.inc.com/graham-winfrey/why-the-cloud-will-transform-small-busi
ness-by-2020.html.
3. Goran Čandrlić, Cloud Computing – Types of Clouds, GLOBALDOTS (Feb. 26,
2013), http://www.globaldots.com/cloud-computing-types-of-cloud/.
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B. Public and Private Clouds
As previously stated, cloud computing can take several forms for
their users. Depending on the information stored, a user may decide
on either a public or private cloud, or a hybrid of the two. The main
difference between a public and private cloud is where the cloud itself
is located. A private-cloud computing system is established if the user
is utilizing a cloud that is located as a part of an extension of an opera-
tion that the business owns and maintains itself.4 On the other hand, a
business would use a public-cloud system if it were to utilize and pay
for the same services from a third party.5
From a cost-benefit analysis, one can see the major advantages for
businesses, specifically for small businesses, for the utilization of pub-
lic clouds. By using a third-party server, rather than creating and
maintaining a costly personal data infrastructure, a business can out-
source their methods of retrieval and storage of information, which
will result in major cost-saving benefits.6 Additionally, public clouds
are known to have a flexible and tailored approach with payment
methods depending on the size and volume of data a business plans to
utilize.7 Lastly, public-clouds are also preferred over private clouds
due to their virtually unlimited access and ease of availability.8
Private-clouds, as opposed to public clouds, are generally used by
corporations and individuals who prefer their information stored on a
“non-shared resource” platform that operates as an extension of the
business itself.9 One major consideration for using a private-cloud sys-
tem that may deter users from their utilization would be the overhead
management and costs associated with maintaining this type of plat-
form.10 That being said, larger corporations that have the available
capital to promote a private-cloud database system are often able to
exploit the many security advantages available to battle increasing
threats of cyber attacks.11
C. Security Problems with the Clouds
Regardless of where or how a cloud user stores their online infor-
mation, be it publically or privately, the threat of data breaches is be-
coming a prevalent problem for businesses in the cloud. Due to this
increasing problem, the FTC created a guide to aid businesses in data
security when sensitive personal information or, in other words, con-
4. Public Cloud or Private Cloud?, AKAMAI, https://www.akamai.com/us/en/re
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sumer’s online personal property, is at risk of cyber attacks.12 This
information often includes consumers’ names, Social Security num-
bers, credit and debit card numbers, and other personal account data
that identifies customers or employees.13 In this publication, the FTC
advises businesses to (1) be aware of all computers and servers where
sensitive personal information is stored, including identifying the con-
nections of computers with such information, using data encryptions
for sensitive customer data; and (2) consider data access restrictions
from certain information.14 Furthermore, a business should be well
advised on password management and laptop security.15 In addition, a
business should understand firewall protections, the use of wireless
and remote access from multiple devices, provide a system in place for
detecting potential breaches, and focus on employee training for a
data security plan.16
Despite the FTC’s efforts, businesses using cloud storage informa-
tion data systems continue to see upsetting revelations of cyber at-
tacks. From 2012 to 2013, the number of reported data breaches
increased by 62% and was further calculated to retain a loss of $18
billion from credit card fraud.17 Furthermore, the U.S. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics has projected a promising outlook for professionals
seeking data security analyst positions with an employment percent-
age increase of 37% between 2012 and 2022.18 These statistics allow
the assumption for increased risk of cyber attacks in the future.
D. Case Law on Security Data Breaches
Just as the technological era emerged exponentially, so to must the
law that governs it. A multitude of case and statutory law has been
promulgated to shape and form the realm of cloud computing
database security. Through the powers provided by Congress, the
FTC is “empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations . . .  from using unfair methods of competition in or af-
fecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or af-
fecting commerce.”19
12. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A
GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-lan
guage/bus69-protecting-personal-information-guide-business_0.pdf.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 9–11.
15. See id. at 12–13.
16. Id. at 14–18.
17. Tony Bradley, 3 Staggering Retail Data Breach Statistics, CSO (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2852383/data-breach/3-staggering-retail-data-breach
-statistics.html.
18. Data Security Analyst: Job Description, Duties and Requirements, STUDY,
http://study.com/articles/Data_Security_Analyst_Job_Description_Duties_and_Requi
rements.html (last visited May 23, 2016).
19. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
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Undoubtedly, the FTC is provided wide discretion in their congres-
sional grant of authority. These powers, however, are often subject to
attack by those who feel the FTC should not be able to act and decide
matters in certain instances. We see this in the FTC’s authority in de-
termining unfair labor practices in connection to the realm of cyber
security, particularly customer data breaches. Unfortunately for those
who question the FTC’s role in cyber law, the courts have decided,
with the pounding gavel of the landmark Wyndham case, that the
FTC’s statutes can and should be interpreted to extend to cyber secur-
ity related issues.20
III. WYNDHAM ANALYSIS
The Wyndham case remains paramount in determining the broad
scope of the FTC’s powers. The case emerged after a series of three
separate cyber security attacks between 2008 and 2009 that allowed
hackers to access the Wyndham Worldwide Corporation’s computer
systems.21 The data breaches resulted in fraudulent charges accruing
over $10.6 million stolen from consumers’ personal and financial in-
formation that happened to be stored in the Wyndham network.22 As
a result, the cyber attacks triggered the FTC to bring an action against
Wyndham, stating that the corporation’s acts amounted to an unfair
practice.23
In terms of Wyndham’s unfair cybersecurity practices, the FTC pro-
claims that Wyndham’s acts “taken together, unreasonably and unnec-
essarily exposed consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and
theft.”24  The FTC specifically stated in their claim that Wyndham:
(1) allowed company branded hotels to store payment card informa-
tion in clear readable text;
(2) allowed the use of easily guessed passwords to access property
management systems;
(3) failed to use available security measures, such as firewalls, to
limit access between the hotel management system, company net-
work, and the Internet;
(4) allowed hotel property management systems to connect to its
network without taking appropriate cybersecurity precautions, in-
cluding not ensuring the hotels had implemented adequate security
policies and procedures, knowingly continued to use an outdated
operating system, and, due to improper management, could not
identify the source of at least one of the cybersecurity attacks;





24. Id. (citing FTC’s complaint at ¶ 24).
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(5) failed to implement restricted access procedures from third
parties;
(6) failed to employ reasonable measures to detect and prevent un-
authorized access to its computer network or to conduct security
investigations; and
(7) failed to follow proper incident response procedures.25
Not agreeing with the allegations against them, Wyndham filed a
motion to dismiss.26 Wyndham’s primary argument focused on the un-
fairness of its conduct and whether the FTC had authority to bring
this action in spite of recent legislation from Congress.27 Throughout a
lengthy discussion over such contentions, the district court denied
Wyndham’s 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim motion and thus estab-
lished that the FTC did in fact have jurisdiction over cybersecurity by
allowing the case to continue.28
Wyndham’s next argument, being a central component to this Note,
delved into Wyndham’s due process rights in that the FTC failed to
give fair notice of the specific cybersecurity standards that Wyndham
was required to follow.29 To shed light on the fair notice doctrine, the
district court highlighted three separate legal standards when agencies
are involved in statutory or regulatory interpretation.30 The first stan-
dard is where an agency administers a statute without special author-
ity to create new rights or obligations.31 Under this approach, courts
will give respect to the agency’s view in its persuasiveness; however,
courts will ultimately be responsible for determining the interpreta-
tion of the statute.32
The second standard the court highlighted was where an agency ex-
ercises its authority in order to fill gaps in its statute.33 Here, the
courts will give deference to the agency as the primary interpreter of
the statute so long as the interpretation is reasonable.34 That being
said, courts often exercise caution when dealing with civil regulations
by stating that parties should be entitled to an “ascertainable cer-
tainty” of what is legally required by the agency’s regulation.35
The third and last standard the district court explained was where
an agency interprets the meaning of its own regulation.36 Here again,
courts will generally defer to a reasonable agency interpretation so
25. Id. at 240–41.
26. Id. at 242.
27. Id. at 244, 247.
28. Id. at 242.
29. Id. at 249.
30. Id. at 250.
31. Id. at 250–51.
32. Id. at 250.
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long as the private parties are entitled to know with ascertainable cer-
tainty what is required.37 The district court goes on to say the second
and third contexts have a higher standard of fair notice due to the
nature on how agencies interpret differently from courts.38 Knowing
this, Wyndham argued they should have been entitled to an ascertain-
able certainty of the FTC’s interpretation of the security requirements
needed to be in accordance with Congress’s Title 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 45(a).39 Unfortunately for Wyndham, the district court found this
argument equally unpersuasive, stating:
Wyndham’s position is unmistakable: the FTC has not yet declared
that cybersecurity practices can be unfair; there is no relevant FTC
rule, adjudication or document that merits deference; and the FTC
is asking the federal courts to interpret § 45(a) in the first instance
to decide whether it prohibits the alleged conduct here. The impli-
cation of this position is similarly clear: if the federal courts are to
decide whether Wyndham’s conduct was unfair in the first instance
under the statute without deferring to any FTC interpretation, then
this case involves ordinary judicial interpretation of a civil statute,
and the ascertainable certainty standard does not apply. The rele-
vant question is not whether Wyndham had fair notice of the FTC’s
interpretation of the statute, but whether Wyndham had fair notice
of what the statute itself requires.40
Therefore, as it may seem, although Wyndham lost their ascertaina-
ble certainty argument, the district court found that Wyndham would
still have a chance for a dismissal by reasons of fair notice principles
when Wyndham claimed they “lacked notice of what specific cyber-
security practices . . . necessary to avoid liability.”41 The court did not
hesitate to reject this argument with ease—stating that Wyndham’s
focus was on the FTC’s interpretation and not the fair notice princi-
ples themselves.42 Therefore, the court ultimately decided not to take
up a matter it was not explicitly asked to take on.
In light of the district court’s decision, they further added reasons
why Wyndham’s fair notice claim fails. Using the FTC’s guidebook on
protecting personal information, as previously mentioned, the court
identified several recommendations that corporations and individuals
can utilize to secure sensitive consumer information. Wyndham ar-
gues, however, that the FTC’s policy is “too vague to be relevant to
the fair notice analysis” in that the FTC fails to provide and identify
specific examples of what is necessary for compliance with § 45(a).43
37. Id.
38. Id. at 251–52; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
39. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 252.
40. Id. at 253–54.
41. Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
42. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 255.
43. Id. at 258.
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Moreover, Wyndham claimed that if the allegations against them are
determined not to be vague, the FTC still failed to explicitly state
what specific cybersecurity measures actually triggered their viola-
tion.44 In support of this argument, Wyndham claimed the FTC al-
leged that the security measures “taken together” caused the FTC’s
suit.45
The district court, siding again with the FTC, tackled both of
Wydham’s arguments on two fronts. The first being that even if the
FTC failed to specify which allegations formed the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions of the violations, businesses like Wyndham could
still ascertain the possibility of liability under the statute.46
As for the second front, the court pointed to Wyndham’s actions
and juxtaposes them to relevant close corollaries.47 Here, the court
used a preceding action against CardSystems Solutions, Inc. (“CSS”)
that provided a framework for cybersecurity measures that previously
failed FTC requirements.48 In viewing both actions respectively, the
FTC’s complaints show that both CSS and Wyndham: (1) created un-
necessary risks to sensitive and vulnerable information; (2) failed to
monitor and adequately access the vulnerability of their web applica-
tions; (3) failed to employ strong ID and user passwords; (4) failed to
use readily available security measures, such as firewalls to limit ac-
cess; and (5) failed to invoke detection measures and investigate for
security threats.49 Using the CCS’s action as a template, the district
court found little trouble concluding Wyndham’s similar cybersecurity
measures were as equally inadequate under §45(a) of the FTC.50
In conclusion, the Wyndham case is primarily known for the expan-
sion of the FTC’s authority into the cybersecurity world with the use
of § 45(a) for unfair trade practices against consumers. Although the
FTC began bringing administrative actions against companies for in-
adequate cybersecurity measures in 2005, the vast majority of those
cases ended in settlements.51 The Wyndham case, therefore, has pro-
vided the FTC with a clear victory in that they may now enter the
cyber world without fear of jurisdictional stripping from Congress.
IV. ARISING QUESTIONS FROM WYNDHAM
With Wyndham’s unveiling of the FTC’s authority in the cyber




47. Id. at 258–59.
48. Id. at 258; see generally In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. C-4168, 2006
WL 2709787 (F.T.C. Sept. 5, 2006).
49. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 258.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 240.
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vate cloud domains for their online data information systems. The dis-
trict and appellate courts from Wyndham found that the hotel
management’s information system clearly lacked the necessary cyber-
security measures with an overwhelming sweep using the help of
CSS’s prior complaint. This now begs the question, what is to be said
about the companies and corporations whose cybersecurity measures
are maintained in a manner closer to the FTC’s required standards?
A. Preceding Case Law
As previously mentioned, although the FTC has been bringing ad-
ministrative actions against companies for inadequate cybersecurity
measures since 2005, many of the disputes have been resolved through
settlements.52 However, certain cases have been brought into light
that offers additional guidance towards a court’s determination of rea-
sonable cybersecurity standards.
In 2005, the FTC issued a complaint against BJ’s Wholesale Club,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, for failing to employ reasonable and ap-
propriate security measures that constituted an unfair practice accord-
ing to FTC standards.53 The FTC’s complaint states that BJ’s
Wholesale Club operated approximately 150 stores in sixteen states.54
The corporation operated under a membership-only agreement in or-
der for consumers to make purchases.55 As a result, during the time of
the complaint, the corporation was stated to have close to eight-mil-
lion valid membership agreements.56
The framework of BJ’s membership requires the corporation to ob-
tain authorization from a bank that issues a credit card to consumers
for purchases made at the store.57 Using a computer network for au-
thorization, BJ’s also must acquire the “customer’s name, card num-
ber and expiration date, and certain other information (collectively,
‘personal information’).”58 Furthermore, BJ’s also uses its computer
networks to manage inventory using wireless scanners that operate
using wireless access points for transmission of information.59
Due to fraudulent charges discovered beginning from November
2003 to February 2004, the FTC investigated BJ’s data security mea-
sures.60 Upon their inspection, the FTC concluded that the corpora-
tion “did not employ reasonable and appropriate measures to secure
52. Id.
53. See generally, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148, 2005 WL 6241019
(F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2015).
54. Id. at **7.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at **1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at **2.
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personal information collected at [BJ’s] stores.”61 Specifically, the
FTC found that the corporation: (1) used no encryptions for informa-
tion that was in transit to and from the bank and for their personal in-
store computer networks; (2) allowed for anonymously accessible
stored information due to commonly known default user IDs and
passwords; (3) failed to provide readily available security measures
that could limit the access to their computer networks; (4) did not use
sufficient detection measures to search for unauthorized access and
further failed to conduct security investigations; and lastly (5) created
an unnecessary risk for the personal information by storing it up to an
additional 30 days when it was no longer needed.62
BJ’s failed security measures led the FTC to conclude that the cor-
poration’s practices employed unfair acts in violation of § 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).63 As a result, sub-
sequent action from the FTC ordered and required BJ’s to establish a
“comprehensive information security program in writing that is rea-
sonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity
of personal information it collects from or about consumers.”64 As
part of the requirement, the security program must also “contain ad-
ministrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to BJ’s
size and complexity, the nature and scope of its activities, and the sen-
sitivity of the personal information collected.”65 Specifically, the FTC
ordered that BJ’s should:
(1) Designate an employee or employees to coordinate and be ac-
countable for the information security program; (2) Identify mate-
rial internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality, and
integrity of consumer information that could result in unauthorized
disclosure, misuse, loss, alteration, destruction, or other compro-
mise of such information, and assess the sufficiency of any safe-
guards in place to control these risks; (3) Design and implement
reasonable safeguards to control the risks identified through risk as-
sessment, and regularly test or monitor the effectiveness of the safe-
guards’ key controls, systems, and procedures; and (4) Evaluate and
adjust its information security program in light of the results of test-
ing and monitoring, any material changes to its operations or busi-
ness arrangements, or any other circumstances that BJ’s knows or
has to reason to know may have a material impact on the effective-
ness of its information security program.66
Furthermore, the FTC also required BJ’s to obtain an assessment
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According to the FTC, the auditor was to certify that the corporation
had met or exceeded the security measures provided for by the order,
as well as to assure that BJ’s security program was sufficiently effec-
tive in providing “reasonable assurance that the security, confidential-
ity, and integrity of consumers’ personal information has been
protected.”68
B. Where Should the Threshold Be?
Returning to Wyndham’s analysis, one can see the strikingly similar
complaints the FTC issued against both the hotel management chain
and BJ’s Wholesale Club. Yet, there still is yet to be a case that identi-
fies specific facts that come closer to the threshold of the FTC’s
standards.
Although there is no concrete discussion for a required minimum
standard on cybersecurity measures concerning sensitive consumer in-
formation stored on public and private clouds, the court from Wynd-
ham attempted to find a common denominator in this respect. In
determining Wyndham’s attempted vagueness argument for their fair
notice claim, the court first identified the regulatory language from
§ 45 that defines a violation as acts or practices that “cause or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers which [are] not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by counter-
vailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”69 The court contin-
ued by stating:
While far from precise, this standard informs parties that the rele-
vant inquiry here is a cost-benefit analysis that considers a number
of relevant factors, including the probability and expected size of
reasonably unavoidable harms to consumers given a certain level of
cybersecurity and the costs to consumers that would arise from in-
vestment in stronger cybersecurity. We acknowledge there will be
borderline cases where it is unclear if a particular company’s con-
duct falls below the requisite legal threshold. But under a due pro-
cess analysis a company is not entitled to such precision as would
eliminate all close calls. Cf. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377,
33 S. Ct. 780, 57 L. Ed. 1232 (1913) (“[T]he law is full of instances
where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the
jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.”). Fair notice
is satisfied here as long as the company can reasonably foresee that
a court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of
the statute.70
Although the court gives reference to the cybersecurity measures of
borderline cases, they refuse to set out a bright line rule to follow.
68. Id.
69. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244 (3rd Cir. 2015); Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
70. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 255–56.
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Instead, the court acknowledges that companies who store sensitive
consumer information should estimate, just as a jury would, on what
would be reasonably required of them.
The standard of reasonableness is one that is well grounded in a
legal sense. In negligence tort claims for example, there is a duty to act
reasonably or to reasonably foresee a potential harm to another.71
Often the term “reasonable” is relevant to specific situations. Profes-
sionals have the duty to act as a reasonable professional would with
similar skill and circumstance.72 In torts concerning children, a child is
to be viewed under the standard of how a reasonable person of like
age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances would act.73
As it may seem, the idea of reasonableness changes under the circum-
stances where it is invoked. This begs the question, what is or what
can be the reasonable standards for cybersecurity measures? Further,
as for the relativeness of a reasonable standard, can there be any con-
sistency in cybersecurity standards when there is constant technologi-
cal advancements?
The court from Wyndham also maintains a determination for cyber-
security standards to be viewed from a cost-benefit analysis.74 Here,
an analysis should consider “the probability and expected size of rea-
sonably unavoidable harms to consumers given a certain level of
cybersecurity” that competes with “the costs to consumers that would
arise from investment in stronger cybersecurity.”75 Again, the court
designates that this should be done on a fact intensive examination
through a case-by-case approach and further remains silent on any
indication for consistency.
In sum, the remaining questions from Wyndham are that of relative-
ness. With limited case law pertaining to failed cybersecurity mea-
sures, companies and cloud users alike bear the burden of providing
what they believe to be reasonable standards of cybersecurity in the
dynamics of the technological world. As a result, consumer personal
and property in businesses’ online databases remain at risk.
V. LEGAL DYNAMICS OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD
The idea of precedent, stare decisis, revolves around a sense of con-
sistency. Throughout history, courts have held true to a form of consis-
tency in order to provide for an ordered and structured legal system.
However, time has proven that some circumstances give way for
changes in the law depending on societal factors throughout a given
era. When certain aspects change, the law answers by adapting to
those changes and strives for some form of consistency yet again.
71. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
72. See Matarese v. Buka, 897 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
73. See generally Goodfellow v. Coggburn, 560 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1977).
74. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 255.
75. Id.
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In attempts to battle the dynamics of the legal world, and yet still
provide a sense of consistency, legislatures and common law circum-
stantially give courts bright line rules, prima facia elements, and even
determinative and dispositive factors. Using these, lawyers and courts
alike can take advantage of the legal system’s desire for consistency
and be sure, for the most part, that courts will not sway off course as
an outlier.
However, time has proven that under certain circumstances,
whether a societal view or a political motivation, the legal world re-
mains to be dynamic and constantly changing. Therefore, throughout
the internet boom and society’s internet-connected world, one can see
the dynamics of the legal world at work. For example, a new form of
law has emerged known as “Internet Law” that encompasses many
legal issues relating to the use of the internet. These legal issues in-
clude: property rights, intellectual property, patents, and contracts. As
a result, just as the internet has led to many legal changes, this Note
proposes yet another change in the cyberworld dealing with adequate
cybersecurity measures.
As previously stated, Wyndham’s decision leaves a question unan-
swered as to what it specifically means to provide reasonable cyber-
security measures. Businesses and individuals who store personal and
consumer information have limited factors to base their own security
measures on and remain unsure of what will meet FTC standards. Al-
though the factors that Wyndham sheds some light, cloud users are
still in the shadows in what they must do themselves to escape the
FTC’s pounding of their gavel. Therefore, this Note will look at the
pros and cons of various legal alternatives that may provide consum-
ers a sense of adequate protection without the harsh results that busi-
nesses fear in terms of liability.
A. The Relevant Factors and Balancing Approach
In order to provide an adequate analysis of the various legal alter-
natives, one must first identify the status quo that was utilized in
Wyndham. In Wyndham, the court found that a reasonableness ap-
proach with the inclusion of a cost-benefit analysis would promote the
best results in terms of the competing parameters between justifying
businesses’ liability and adequate consumer protections.76 Under the
scope of this analysis, the FTC is able to show flexibility in their deter-
minations by promoting their findings under a case-by-case analysis.
In essence, the FTC is provided with much discretion when using this
approach because there has yet to be any specifics as to what is actu-
ally required for companies finding themselves in a position like that
of Wyndham Worldwide.
76. See id. at 236.
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As previously stated, the discussion over the cybersecurity measures
used in Wyndham were far from reasonable in nearly all aspects and
therefore made the FTC’s decision to bring the action at all relatively
easy. During the FTC’s investigations, the agency found that rather
than using weak firewalls, Wyndham failed to use any firewalls at criti-
cal access points.77 In addition, Wyndham also failed to use any en-
cryptions for their customer files and also failed to require some users
to change their login credentials at all.78 Among the other failures
from Wyndham’s cybersecurity measures, it was seemingly simple to
understand why the FTC is seeking recourse for Wyndham’s
consumers.
In retrospect, the court from Wyndham recognizes there will be in-
stances where it would be “unclear if a particular company’s conduct
falls below the requisite legal threshold.”79 That being the case, when
a company is at the discretion of the FTC, should there not be a legal
threshold readily apparent? To this, the court from Wyndham shies
away from giving specific requirements and instead points to the
FTC’s guidebook, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Busi-
ness, created in 2007.80 Arguably, it can be stated that this guidebook,
having not been mandated by law, offers no real threshold for busi-
nesses other than what could be done in order to implement adequate
cybersecurity measures. However, the court believed following the of-
fered guidelines would have placed Wyndham in a better position to
avoid liability.81
In addition to the standard of reasonable cybersecurity measures,
the court from Wyndham also invoked a cost-benefit analysis. In an
even less specific manner, the court stated business liability rests on
the balancing of the “probability and expected size of reasonably una-
voidable harms to consumers given a certain level of cybersecurity and
the costs to [businesses] that would arise from investment in stronger
cybersecurity.”82 Therefore, businesses are told they should imple-
ment security standards based on the harms that could potentially oc-
cur to their consumer base. Thus, the more at stake for consumer
theft, the more security standards a business should implement.
Again, this leaves a business at the FTC’s mercy in that it must ascer-
tain what standards of security are needed with no clear way to know
if it is in accordance with FTC standards. The court from Wyndham
acknowledged this uncertainty and still chose not to delineate but
rather leave it to a “man’s fate . . . on . . . estimating rightly.”83
77. Id. at 256.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 255–56.
80. Id. at 256.
81. Id. at 257.
82. Id. at 255–56.
83. Id. at 256 (citing Nash v. United States, 299 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)).
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The standards used in Wyndham offer extreme flexibility through-
out society’s technological advancements and growing reliance on the
use of the internet. By using the reasonable, relevant factors and cost-
benefit analysis, the FTC can continue to impose liability on busi-
nesses that fall below the desired threshold, even with the growing
concern of the changing technological world. As new and improved
methods of both cyber threats and security standards become in use,
the FTC can stand firmly on the standards used in Wyndham to com-
bat any of the new cyber methods by invoking their idea of reasona-
bleness. Although this parallels smoothly with the dynamics of the
cyber world, much is left uncertain to those businesses affected most
by the FTC’s vague cybersecurity measures.
B. The Bright Line Test and the Required Minimum
Leaving a more flexible approach for a hard-and-fast, consistent ap-
proach may provide the additional benefits for businesses, but at what
cost? If consistency in the law and legal effects were of the most im-
portance, then implementing cybersecurity measures under a bright
line test would most likely have the best results. Under an approach
like this, businesses and individuals who are storing personal con-
sumer information would adhere to the black letter law that
designates exactly what is required of them in order to avoid liability
in the occurrence of a data breach.
Although this test may provide a sure shot approach to avoiding
liability for businesses using the cloud, it is likely to produce addi-
tional problems along the way. For example, if the legal system were
to implement the exact cybersecurity measures that businesses need to
adhere to, then there is a strong likelihood that those measures would
soon become obsolete due to technological advancements. As a result,
consumers will ultimately be at greater risks due to the legal delay
that would apply when it came to updating the law to the additionally
discovered cyber threats. In addition, businesses would have no incen-
tive to continue to strive for the best possible security measures for
their consumers knowing that they would be shielded from liability
simply because they abided by what was required of them.
Apart from a bright line test, another way that may be able to bring
cybersecurity measures up to adequate measures would be the estab-
lishment of a required minimum approach. This approach, much like a
bright line test, would undoubtedly benefit businesses in ascertaining
what must be done to avoid liability. However, in understanding that
this approach essentially parallels the bright line test, perhaps the an-
swer to ascertaining both adequate cybersecurity measures for con-
sumers, as well as providing businesses with a way for avoiding
liability, lies with its application.
If, for example, a required minimum approach was working in tan-
dem with an incentive program for businesses, then society may be
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able to achieve a deterrence of cyber attacks as well as a fair approach
for businesses ascertaining adequate cybersecurity standards. In addi-
tion, businesses that compete for the same class of consumers will also
have a competitive advantage if they were to continue to strive for up-
to-date cybersecurity measures as the technological world advances.
This approach could also allow for little legal involvement due to
the possibility of its self-regulating aspects. Here, like all other busi-
ness markets, the consumers and businesses will be able to decide
what cybersecurity measures to provide and what measures to accept.
So long as the security measures are known, consumers can make an
informed decision of where they are willing to place their personal
information. As a result, this approach may promote healthy competi-
tion for businesses by letting them decide what to offer. Therefore, a
business would only be required to implement the legally required
minimum, but without more, remains at the peril of other businesses
that may decide to provide additional security and presumably gain
consumers due to their added protections.
Unfortunately, by their very essence, a bright line rule or required
minimum standard for cybersecurity measures is, and always will be,
at risk of becoming obsolete by the nature of the cyber world. Unlike
that of the flexible reasonable approach used in Wyndham, the bright
line and required minimum approaches are subject to less flexibility
on the dynamics and therefore may provide inadequate results in
terms of consumer protection in the long run.
C. Providing the Specifics
The FTC brought their action against Wyndham Worldwide based
on § 45(n) of Title 15 of the U.S.C.A. Subsection 45(n) claims that the
FTC shall have no authority to declare an act as unfair unless “the act
or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competi-
tion.”84 Using the statute’s text, the court from Wyndham construed
its meaning to represent a cost-benefit analysis among the relevant
factors as discussed previously. However, under no circumstances
does the statute, nor the court’s interpretation of the statute, relate to
any specific cybersecurity measures that should be taken into account.
A question thus comes to mind, could the FTC promulgate a new rule
that works in accordance with § 45(n) that would provide for specific
cybersecurity measures?
In order to answer this, perhaps guidance lies in other federal estab-
lishments. As such, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (“HIPAA”) under the Department of Health and Human
Services is able to show how another federal entity deals with its sensi-
84. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
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tive consumer data. Understanding medical documentation is of clear
importance in terms of privacy and confidentiality, HIPAA provides
an in-depth approach on multiple safeguards that the department
should take into consideration, such as administrative, physical, and
technological safeguards.85
As to HIPAA’s technological safeguards, it lays out a more detailed
variation of cybersecurity standards than the FTC’s counterpart under
§ 45(n).86 Particularly, § 164.312(a)(1) states that covered entities or
business associates in the realm of protected health information must
“[i]mplement technical policies and procedures for electronic informa-
tion systems that maintain electronic protected health information to
allow access only to those persons or software programs that have
been granted access rights.”87 Furthermore, subsection (a)(2) also
provides implementation specifications including: a required unique
user identification, a required emergency access procedure, an ad-
dressable automatic logoff function, and an addressable encryption
and decryption standard.88 The remainder of § 164.312 also describes
with specific particularity that a standard should be in place for verifi-
cation of persons trying to access certain health information, and fur-
ther provides details for the transmission of data through electronic
communications in order to  guard against unauthorized access.89
In viewing the aims of HIPAA’s technological safeguards and the
FTC’s interpretation of unfair practices in regards to cybersecurity
measures, it is apparent that both statutes embody certain protections
to consumers who are at risk of losing online personal property and
information. Furthermore, both statutes aim to protect personal data
that, if found to be in the wrong hands, could cause severe exposure of
confidential information.
Medical records contain data ranging from Social Security numbers,
payment history, current medications and diagnoses, as well as contact
information. However, in examining the data stored by businesses us-
ing the cloud, it is not uncommon to see much of the same informa-
tion. In Wyndham, for example, the hotel’s property management
system contained customer’s “names, home addresses, email ad-
dresses, telephone numbers, payment card account numbers, expira-
tion dates, and security codes.”90 The similarities between medical and
business records provide merit that this type of information should be
protected under a similar and consistent approach.
85. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 164.308–312 (2014).
86. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 164.312 (2014).
87. § 164.312(a)(1) (emphasis added).
88. § 164.312(a)(2) (emphasis added).
89. § 164.312(d)–(e).
90. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3rd Cir. 2015).
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As a result, this last alternative calls for the implementation of a
rule by the FTC that would resemble the “Technological Safeguards”
from the Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected
Health Information. Given that the FTC’s guidebook on protecting
personal information for businesses provides for much of the specifics
in a manner like that of HIPAA’s Technological Safeguards, it must be
stressed that this guidebook is not a sufficient source of authority and
thus cannot be relied on as a source of law. Instead, the FTC will have
to use other means in accomplishing this task.
Although the FTC lacks the power to use its guidebook as a source
of law, the FTC does have the power to make and create new laws by
the powers vested in it by Congress. This can be done in one of two
ways. The FTC can first begin by referencing HIPAA’s Technological
Safeguards in its adjudicative proceedings as a fair and reasonable
cybersecurity measure that should be hereafter followed by future po-
tential violators in the business setting. This case-by-case process
would allow the FTC to visualize and ascertain if HIPAA’s Technolog-
ical Safeguards could adequately provide the missing link in justifying
specific and reasonable cybersecurity measures. Furthermore, busi-
nesses that contain personal consumer information via cloud comput-
ing will therefore be afforded proper notice upon the FTC’s intentions
to utilize this new standard as a viable method.
As more cases concerning the adequacy of businesses’ cybersecurity
measures shape the agency’s proceedings, the FTC may decide to take
their second option and promulgate a new rule that mimics HIPAA’s
safeguards under its authority from Congress. Under Title 15 of the
U.S.C.A. §57(a), Congress has provided the FTC the power to make
“rules which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” and such rules
“may include requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing
such acts or practices.”91
Creating a rule in this manner requires the FTC to follow several
procedural milestones. In order for its creation, the FTC must first
publish notice of its proposal and state “with particularity the text of
the rule,” as well as provide its reasoning.92 The FTC must also allow
any interested persons to submit their arguments and views of the pro-
posed rule as well as make these comments publically available.93 In
addition, the FTC must provide an opportunity for an informal hear-
ing that must be in compliance with Title 15 of the U.S.C.A. § 57(c).94
Lastly, the FTC must promulgate, if appropriate, a final rule in accor-
dance with the rulemaking record.95 This includes the rule itself, a
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statement of basis and purpose, the transcript, any written submis-
sions, and any other relevant information.96
Therefore, assuming the FTC abides by these requirements, the
agency can utilize HIPAA’s Technological Safeguards to promulgate
their own specific standards. By creating a rule that mimics the Tech-
nological Safeguards, the FTC can provide the cloud providers and
businesses an efficient rule that is proven to work, as well as define
with specificity what the FTC desires when viewing a business’s cyber-
security measures. Furthermore, a similar rule provided by the FTC
would allow for more consistency in the protections of personal prop-
erty and information that is stored online.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the technological world advances, it is imperative that the laws
that govern the cyber world adjust to its dynamics. Today, more and
more people are finding themselves subject to having their personal
information stored with the use of cloud computing. With the online
storing of personal information such as names, addresses, Social Se-
curity numbers, debit and credit card numbers, and even medical diag-
noses, people are continuously at risk over not only privacy concerns,
but also major financial concerns in the event of a cybersecurity
attack.
To battle the elements of this inevitable harm, the FTC has taken
multiple steps in cracking down on businesses that fail to provide ade-
quate cybersecurity measures for their consumers. Often, the FTC
thoroughly investigates the business’ online data infrastructure only to
find severe shortcomings that are deemed unreasonable in terms of
Title 15 of the U.S.C.A. § 45(n). In other instances, however, the case
may not be so close and the threshold between reasonable and unrea-
sonable cybersecurity measures can be anywhere from a simple en-
cryption method to a limited data access point from specific personnel
only.
Therefore, this uncertainty calls for additional specifics in the FTC’s
administrative proceedings in order to fill the void. Although the FTC
has wide discretion in its rulings, this Note proposes that the agency
attempt to follow the path the Department of Health takes in protect-
ing important medical documents located online. Under HIPAA’s
Technological Safeguards, the desired additional specifics pertaining
to cybersecurity measures are readily available for the FTC. Through
adjudicative proceedings, the FTC can acquire a general sense of how
the rule should be applied. Thereafter, so long as the desired results
have been accomplished, the FTC should implement formal rulemak-
ing proceedings that essentially mimic HIPAA’s Technological
Safeguards.
96. § 57a(e)(1)(B).
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Creating a rule with such similarity will only lead to benefits for all
parties involved. Businesses that store consumer information online
will now have a consistent rule on what cybersecurity measures must
be accomplished regarding their consumers in order to avoid an FTC
action. Consumers who are most at risk will now have adequate pro-
tections afforded to them on a much broader and readily known scale.
Lastly, the FTC will benefit by providing a rule that has been proven
to work in other administrations, thus relieving the worry for
uncertainties.
In conclusion, society’s reliance on the internet and the cyber world
is continuing to grow exponentially. By way of technology, consumers
now have the power to stay connected virtually anywhere. Consumers
can now purchase products with the touch of a button and can create
various accounts with multiple websites. Unfortunately, these
processes often require the consumer to provide personal information
that is stored via cloud online databases. As a result, consumers are
subjecting themselves to vulnerability by way of identity theft, privacy
concerns, and financials harms. It is therefore imperative that the legal
implications surrounding the cybersecurity measures also remain dy-
namic and continue to evolve.
